Stoneridge – On Tuesday, what has been billed by many as the most important securities case to be decided in years was argued before the Supreme Court, Stoneridge Investment Partners v. Scientific-America, Inc.  To be sure, Stoneridge has the potential to be a blockbuster decision, redefining liability under Section 10(b) – the weapon of choice in most securities class actions – and perhaps even the way corporate America does business.  The question in Stoneridge is whether business partners of a public company can be held liable when that company uses a three-way barter transaction to falsify its books and defraud its shareholders.  Plaintiffs claim the business partners are accountable based on “scheme liability,” a concept crafted by the SEC which posits that third parties involved with public companies that commit securities fraud can be held liable under Section 10(b) as primary violators under certain circumstances.  Defendants claim they were just involved in a business transaction and any fraud was committed by Charter Communications against its shareholders. 

While adopting either of the positions advocated by the parties could produce the landmark decision many have speculated about for months, questions from the Justices during the argument suggest that result is unlikely.  Rather, a middle position construing the scope of Section 10(b) and vesting substantial discretion in the District Courts to evaluate fraud claims seems the more likely result as previously discussed (here).  

Insider trading – Last week, another chapter in the “pillow talk” insider trading cases was written, while the enforcement spotlight was again focused on executive trading or Rule 10b5-1 plans. 

This pillow talk insider trading case seems to prove that the couple that trades together stays together – at least most of the time.  Randi Collota, a former Morgan Stanley lawyer, and her lawyer husband Christopher, were sentenced on October 5 following their guilty pleas last spring to criminal charges on an insider trading scheme which some have labeled the largest since the 1980s (here).  Ms. Collota was order to serve four years probation with only 60 days in custody, primarily on nights and weekends.  Mr. Collota was ordered to serve three years probation.  Each defendant is required to pay a fine of $3,000 and forfeit $4,500.  Both defendants accepted full responsibility for their actions.  Prior to being sentenced, Ms. Collota requested that she be permitted to remain out of prison with her husband, who has a heart condition, and so she can continue to work.

The misuse of executive trading or Rule 10b5-1 plans may again be the focus of SEC scrutiny for insider trading.  Last spring, SEC Enforcement Director Linda Thomsen stated that the staff was reviewing these plans to see if they were being abused (discussed here).  In an October 8, 2007 letter to SEC Chairman Christopher Cox, Richard H. Moore, treasurer of North Carolina, asked the Commission to investigate the abuse of such plans by Countrywide CEO Angelo Mozilo.  According to Mr. Moore, “CEO Angelo Mozilo apparently manipulated his trading plans to cash in, just as the subprime crisis was heating up and Countrywide’s fortunes were cooling off.  It has been reported that Mr. Mozilo unloaded 4.9 million Countrywide shares – worth more than $138 million – between November 2006 and August 2000.  He reportedly changed the plans outlining how many of his shares would be sold monthly at least three times in a five-month period beginning in October 2006, allowing him to sell the stock before its price fell dramatically.”  While the SEC, in accord with its policy, would not comment on what action, if any, it would take, Ms. Thomsen noted the next day in a speech to the National Association of Stock Plan Professionals that the staff was looking closely at Rule 10b5-1 plans.  If Mr. Moore’s allegations are correct, the SEC may have found the case it has been looking for since at least last spring.

Option backdating – For months, the SEC has had in excess of one hundred companies and a host of related individuals under the investigative microscope for backdating options.  DOJ has done the same, although it appears to have a lesser number of persons under scrutiny.  Last week, another of these cases dribbled out.  Former SafeNet Inc. CFO Carole D. Argo pled guilty to securities fraud in connection with her role in backdating option grants worth millions of dollars for herself and others at the company.  Sentencing is scheduled for January 21, 2008.  Since most issuers conduct an internal investigation to determine what happed when a question about the backdating and the SEC has been investigating these same companies for months, one can only wonder when these cases will be resolved.  U.S. v. Argo is a continuation of the trickle of cases brought to date.  One can only wonder when the dozens of remaining cases will be resolved.

The decision in Stoneridge v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., No. 06-41, which will be handed down later this term following argument yesterday before the Supreme Court, has been widely viewed as potentially the most important securities private damage action in years. It may be. Potential is not always actual, however. Indeed, many of the questions from the Justices yesterday suggested that the decision in Stoneridge may be an important decision, but not the decision of the decade.

At issue in Stoneridge is who may be held liable in a private damage action under Section 10(b) – that is, can business partners be held liable as part of a scheme to defraud with the primary violator public company? The resolution of this question has been closely watched by many, including business groups and shareholder advocates.

Plaintiffs relied on a theory of “scheme liability” (discussed in our earlier posting here), drawn from the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Simpson v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 452 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2006) and an amicus brief of the SEC filed in that case, to argue that the vendors in a barter transaction which Charter Communication used to cook its books were primary violators, liable to Charter’s shareholders. Early in the arguments the Chief Justice raised a key point of concern about plaintiffs’ theory, suggesting it would expand liability under Section 10(b) at a time when the Court should be contracting it: “I mean, we don’t get in this business of implying private rights of action any more. And isn’t the effort by Congress to legislate a good signal that they have kind of picked up the ball and they are running with it and we shouldn’t?” Later Chief Justice Roberts clarified and amplified his comment noting “my suggestion is not that we should go back and say that there is no private right of action. My suggestion is that we should get out of the business of expanding it, because Congress has taken over and is legislating in the area in the way they weren’t back when we implied the right of action under 10(b).” This has been a key theme in a number of the Court’s decisions construing the judicially crafted remedy under Section 10(b).

Similarly the Chief Justice, along with Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Alito, raised a number of questions about the difference between scheme liability and aiding and abetting, which the Court held in Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994) was not covered by the statute. The exchanges with counsel for plaintiffs on this issue prompted Justice Alito at one point to comment that “I see absolutely no difference between your test and the elements of aiding and abetting.” Justice Kennedy amplified this statement, noting that “there are any number of kickbacks and mismanagements and petty fraud that go on in the business, and business people know that any publicly held company’s shares are going to be affected by its profits, so I see no limits” to plaintiffs’ theory of scheme liability. A bright line and predictable result was a key point in Central Bank, and has been a theme of the Court’s 10(b) jurisprudence in recognition of the potential harm caused by frivolous securities fraud damage suits.

Respondents focused on the language of the statute. The complaint here, defendants argued, is little more than rendering substantial assistance to another who is making a false statement. This position prompted Justice Ginsburg to note that silence is, in fact, the point: “That’s the essence of the scheme. You said that they – they are home free because they didn’t themselves make any statement to investors. But they set up Charter to make those statements, to swell its revenues – revenues that it in fact didn’t have.”

In a series of questions which may suggest that the Justices are looking for a compromise position between the extremes of the parties, Justice Ginsburg asked whether there is some kind of middle ground between primary violator and aider and abettor: “That’s if they are aiders and abettors, which is what Congress covered [in Section 20e of the Exchange Act]. And I again go back to see if there is another category or is everyone – either Charter, the person whose stock is at stake, the company whose stock is at stake and everyone else is an aider?” Later Justice Kennedy raised essentially the same issue by asking defense counsel if, under the common law of torts, there was a category between primary violator and aider and abettor. Justice Souter echoed this theroy a short while later by asking whether there was “overlap” between the two categories – that is, some kind of common ground which would, in fact, be a third category.

As the arguments came to a conclusion, a series of questions may have suggested the potential basis the Justices are considering for their decision. First, Justice Stevens asked defense counsel whether reliance is an element of a private cause of action or an element of a statutory violation. Defense counsel noted that it is an element of a private action – a response drawn straight out of the Court’s Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc., v. Broude, 544 U.S. 356 (2005) decision two years ago (discussed in our posting here).  Next, defense counsel, who argued that the SEC should bring actions such as this one, essentially admitted that a government enforcement action could not really substitute for a damage action here in terms of compensating shareholders, since the Sarbanes Oxley fair funds provision could probably not be used in this case. Finally, the Chief Justice, in a comment echoed later by Justice Ginsburg, noted that the decision below was based on a determination that there was no deceptive act, not a lack of reliance. These questions may suggest the Court will not consider the reliance issue, which is a key part of the defense argument, as well as that of the Solicitor General.

While it is always prudent not to read to much into questions by the Justices, the arguments today may suggest that Stoneridge will leave the blockbuster decision to another day. To be sure, the Court raised key themes from its earlier cases about implied causes of action, the difference between aiding and abetting and a primary violation, and the lack of certainty of application offered by plaintiffs’ scheme liability theory. At the same time, repeated questions searching for a middle ground and concerning the fact that the lower court did not consider a key part of the arguments relied on by defendants and the Solicitor General suggest that the Court may opt for a narrow ground of decision focused on the what type of conduct – affirmative statement, deception, silence – violates the statute. In that event, the Court could leave the application of those principles for another day, just as it did last June in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S.Ct. 2499 (2007) (discussed here).  No doubt Stoneridge will be an important decision. It may not, however, be the decision of the decade.